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Abstract: 
 
Objective: I update the analysis of attitudinal polarization originally presented in DiMaggio, Evans and 
Bryson (DEB) (1996) by using newly available  survey data.   Method: Like DEB, I derive aggregate 
distributional parameters for social groups in each year of the surveys, and then regress the year of the 
surveys on each parameter.  Results: As in DEB’s original paper, there is little evidence of general 
polarization in attitudes between the early 1970s and today.  However, while DEB found some 
evidence that polarization in the public may be the result of polarization in our political system, the 
additional years of data show that this conclusion is inescapable.  Conclusions: While political scientists 
have recently found polarization among our elected officials on economic issues, it seems clear that 
members of the public who are involved in  politics are becoming polarized on moral issues.  Political 
scientists should follow up on this research to see not only if elected officials are polarized on these 
issues, but also the causal direction of the link between officials and the public.  
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Have Americans’ Attitudes Become More Polarized? – an Update 
 
In 1996, DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson (henceforth DEB) published a paper called “Have 
Americans’ Social Attitudes Become More Polarized?” (1996).  Their purpose was to test claims that 
the American public had become increasingly polarized over a range of social issues in recent decades.  
Scholars claimed, for example, that there has been a trend toward “ideological polarization in domestic 
and social concerns” (Wyszomirski, 1994, 37), that there has been “sharpening cultural polarization of 
U.S. society after the mid-1970s” (Ellison and Musick, 1993, 379) and, most famously, that American 
society is engaged in a “culture war” (Hunter, 1991; Hunter, 1994).  Using more than 20 years of 
General Social Survey (GSS) and National Election Studies (NES) data, and examining four types of 
polarization for 18 social issues, DEB found little evidence of polarization. The only exceptions were 
polarization in the general public and most sub-groups on the issue of abortion, and a growing 
polarization between people who self-identify as Democrats and Republicans. 
Their conclusion, based on trend data ending in 1992 (NES) and (1994) GSS, could have 
resulted from one of three reasons. First, and most obviously, it could be because there is indeed little 
polarization in the public.  Second, it could be because their statistical models were based on, at most, 
15 cases, with an average of 10, because their methods required aggregation of the data for each year 
of the survey.  Despite using a generous p-value of .10 to give the benefit of the doubt to the 
polarization argument, trends must be quite strong to be significant with only 10 cases.  Third, they might 
not have found polarization because it had not occurred yet.  That is, the social critics might have been 
prescient, observing the first indications of the underlying causes of general polarization that would take  
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nearly a decade to become apparent.  The events of the 1990s, such as the “contract with America” 
and the Clinton presidency, may have finally created the predicted polarization. 
With additional years of data I can evaluate the latter two interpretations.  In this paper I 
replicate DEB’s analysis, taking advantage of the completion of the 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000 NES, 
and the 1996, 1998 and 2000 GSS.  The purpose of my work is to see whether, in light of  the 
additional years of data and additional statistical power, the conclusions of DEB should be modified. 
 
MEASURING POLARIZATION 
There is a severe challenge in writing a paper such as this.  DEB committed large sections of 
their paper to deriving four types of polarization, explaining why they might be of substantive importance 
for social scientists, how they might interact, and, most importantly, how they could be measured.  
Given that my purpose is to replicate their paper with additional data, and given that I do not change or 
challenge any of these preliminaries, I am left with the challenge of providing enough summary so that the 
general reader will understand my analysis, without repeating what has been published elsewhere.  With 
this in mind, I summarize how DEB conceived of and measured polarization and encourage the reader 
to look at their original paper for further explanations and justifications.  Beyond your local research 
library, it is also available online at http://www.jstor.org. 
DEB offered a multidimensional and fairly comprehensive theory and method for analyzing 
polarization in opinions.  First, they asserted that polarization is not heated political rhetoric.  Polarization 
refers to the distance between the various positions, not to the form or the content of those positions.  
Moreover, polarization can refer to a process or a static condition.  DEB studied the process of  
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polarization, comparing the shape of an opinion distribution to the same distribution at other points in 
time rather than comparing the current distribution to a “theoretical maximum.” 
Below, I describe DEB’s four dimensions along which a particular population may be 
considered more or less polarized across time -- each firmly grounded in some mechanism of consensus 
or mobilization. 
    (1) The dispersion of opinions found in a given population may affect a group's ability to arrive 
at political consensus.  DEB used the statistical parameter, sample variance, to measure dispersion.  
Increasing sample variance indicates increasing dispersion of opinion. 
(2) Bimodality – rifts in a distribution of opinions -- is the extent to which opinions cluster into 
separate "camps." Bimodality differs from dispersion in that it measures gaps in the distribution of 
responses rather than the average distance between them.  DEB argued for the importance of this 
dimension by noting that “because actors in middle attitudinal positions can often broker between ex-
tremes, the extent to which opinion variation leads to conflict is likely to depend on the extent to which 
occupants of polar stances are isolated from one another” (DiMaggio et al. 1996, 694).  A lack of 
persons in the middle between pro and con positions, for example, would increase our tendency to 
experience opinion on abortion as sharply divided. DEB measured bimodality using kurtosis, with lower 
values of kurtosis indicative of greater polarization in this bimodal sense. 
(3) Consolidation of opinion along some other set of socially significant lines (such as religious 
affiliation or social position) increases the potential for political mobilization.  DEB operationalized this 
dimension as differences in the mean of variable between pairs of groups.  This is the measure that has 
traditionally been used (alone) to measure opinion polarization (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986; Page and  
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Shapiro 1992, ch. 7; Brint 1984, 110-21).  
(4) DEB also presented data on a fourth dimension -- opinion constraint.  This is “the extent to 
which opinions on any one item in an opinion domain . . . are associated with opinions on any other” 
(DiMaggio et al. 1996, 696).  This is an indicator of ideological cohesion, when a person’s views on 
one issue are increasingly predictable by their views on a related one.  This is important for conflict 
because actors need to organize around coherent sets of ideas, such as support of “family values” or  
“individual rights.”  DEB measured constraint with Cronbach’s alpha which, while usually used to 
measure scale reliability, can also be interpreted as the degree of association among the items in the 
scale due to the latent variable beneath them (DiMaggio et al. 1996, 697). 
It is important to understand not only that there are four dimensions of polarization, but also that 
they work together in specific ways. Most importantly, although dispersion and bimodality are sufficient 
indicators of polarization within groups, polarization between groups (consolidation) is less likely to 
result in conflict if it is accompanied by increasing internal polarization within the opposing groups.  -
Within-group polarization decreases the probability of mobilization of that group by making it difficult for 
advocates of any position to organize the group as a whole.   Therefore, following DEB, I regard two 
groups as polarizing in a manner likely to lead to conflict only when differences between the groups 
grow and  polarization inside the groups remains constant or declines.    
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.  National Election Studies, 1972-2000. 
 
 
Variable            N           Mean       Std. Dev.       Min       Max   
Year         29399      1985.372     8.575024       1972       2000   
 
Sub-Populations 
   Female       29399      .5593388     .4964749          0          1   
   Age: 
      Under 30       29281       .227622     .4193045          0          1   
      Under 35       29281      .3404938     .4738834          0          1   
      Over 45       29281      .4437348     .4968326          0          1   
   Race: 
      White       27861      .8808011     .3240282          0          1   
      Black       27861      .1191989    .3240282          0          1   
   Education 
      College Degree    29119      .1984271     .3988224          0          1   
      <= High School     29119      .5050311     .4999833          0          1   
   Region = South     29399      .3522229     .4776711          0          1   
   Liberal       20901      .2564949     .4367086          0          1   
   Conservative     20901      .4187359     .4933638          0          1   
   Democrat       28781      .3889024     .4875096          0          1   
   Republican       28781      .2541955     .4354156          0          1   
   Voted in Last 
      Presidential Election  27196      .6486983     .4773858          0          1   
   Politically Active     26920      .1132987     .3169634          0          1   
 
Attitude Measures 
   Omnibus       13194      311.6284     77.94105     52        614   
   Government Aid  
      to Minorities      24609      4.456662     1.801536          1          7   
   Abortion attitudes: 
      1972-1978     6628      2.419282     .9947664          1          4   
      1980      1320      2.275379     .9526905          1          4   
      1980-2000     18409      2.145907     1.087894          1          4   
   Women’s Roles     23186      2.763219      1.96348   1          7   
   Feeling Thermometers: 
      Blacks       23688      32.31619     20.42596          0         97   
      Poor people    22397         24.98     18.16883          0         97   
      Liberals       22223      44.55713     20.99861          0         97   
      Conservatives     22351      59.12425     19.34029          0         97      
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics.  General Social Survey.   
 
Variable            N           Mean       Std. Dev.       Min       Max   
Year         40,226   1986.455     8.676     1972  2000   
 
Sub-Populations 
   Female       40,226   .561     .496     0          1   
   Male       40,226   .439     .496     0          1   
   Age: 
      Under 30       40,093   .225     .418     0          1   
      Under 35       40,093   .340     .474     0          1   
      Over 45       40,093   .439     .496     0          1   
   Race: 
      White       40,226   .847     .360     0          1   
      Black       40,226   .122     .327     0          1   
   Education: 
      College Degree     40,076   .186     .389     0          1   
      <= High School     40,106   .583     .493     0          1   
   South       40,226   .340     .474     0          1   
   Liberal       34,512   .272     .445     0          1   
   Conservative     34,512   .341     .474     0          1   
   Democrat       40,023   .381     .486     0          1   
   Republican       40,023   .260     .438     0          1   
   Voted in last Presidential  
      Election          36,090   .697     .459     0          1   
   Religious Conservative   38,416   .247     .431     0          1   
   Religious  Liberal        38,416   .243     .429     0          1   
 
Attitude Measures 
   Omnibus       3,862      86.848     11.697           55        122   
   Abortion Attitude Scale   21,298      9.607     2.394     7         14   
   Women’s Public  Roles   19,357      3.678     .977     3          6   
   Family Gender Roles Scale  14,639      9.199     2.613     4         16   
   Sexuality  Attitudes Scale  11,286      9.196     2.444     3         12   
   Racism Scale     5,478      11.080   1.955            8         16   
   Crime and Justice Scale   21,369      4.895     .694     3          6   
   Sex Education     22,596      1.148     .355     1          2   
   School Prayer     21,004      1.602     .489     1          2   
   Divorce Law     24,889       2.241     .854     1          3   
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DATA, MEASURES AND ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
Following DEB I use the General Social Survey (GSS) (Davis and Smith 1972-2000) and the 
National Election Studies (NES) (Sapiro et al. 2001).  I created the same attitude scales and defined 
the same sub-populations as DEB.  I refer the reader to DEB for details of the various coding decisions 
they made (see primarily pages 699-705).   The updated descriptive statistics,  which include the 
additional years of data, can be found in Tables 1 and 2. 
As shown in Table 1, from the NES I have indicators of attitudes toward government aid to 
minorities, abortion, women’s roles and feelings towards blacks, poor people, liberals and 
conservatives.  I also have an omnibus scale that combines these scales into one measure.  For the GSS 
I have scales for attitudes toward abortion, women’s public roles, family gender roles, sexuality, 
racism
2, crime and justice, sex education, school prayer and divorce law (see Table 2).  I also have an 
omnibus scale for the GSS.  For all of these scales, their individual components have been re-coded so 
that more “conservative” responses receive higher numbers.
3  Because all of the attitude measures in the 
NES except the omnibus measure are single questions, there are no Cronbach’s alpha analyses 
                                                                 
2 African-American respondents are excluded from the racial attitude scales in the 1977 GSS because in that 
year they were only asked the question on busing.  After 1977, all questions were asked of African-Americans. 
3  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the GSS used a split ballot design.  For the omnibus and racism scales, 
this meant that the questions necessary to complete the scale were only asked together on one-third of the ballots, 
resulting in a very small number of cases.  When examining the within-group population for those respondents with 
college degrees, the number of cases for those years dropped precipitously low because of the relatively low 
percentage of respondents with college degrees.  DEB, therefore combined the data from 1988 and 1989 for the 
college graduate analyses in these two scales (with the year data re-coded as 1988.5).  1990 and 1991 were also 
combined to create 1990.5.  Similarly, in between-group comparisons, DEB lacked enough African-Americans, 
religious liberals and religious conservatives for these scales in these years, and the same years were combined as 
above.  Finally, African-Americans were specifically not asked a few of the racism questions in 1977, so that year is 
missing for the African-American/White comparisons for the racism and omnibus scales, resulting in there only 
being six years in the analyses.  The tables presented below show which analyses used fewer cases.  
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(constraint) for these variables.  Because the sex education, school prayer and divorce law variables of 
the GSS are dichotomous, and because the variance and kurtosis of a dichotomous variable provides 
no more information than its mean, those attitude measures are only used in the analyses which compare 
the means of groups over time.  
 
Analytic Strategy 
I have decided to replicate exactly the methods of DEB, not only so that direct comparisons can 
be made, but also because other possible methods are impractical.  Other 
 methods  could have been used to measure polarization, but  they typically can only be used for one 
dimension of polarization.  For example, public opinion researchers have long examined interaction 
terms between a group and a year variable to determine whether the means of two groups are diverging 
(Page and Shapiro 1992).  DEB’s consolidation measure is closely related to this technique.  Similarly, 
others have split data into two time periods and compared the variances of a group between the two 
periods using an F-test  (Gay et al. 1996).  This method, while related to DEB’s use of dispersion 
(variance), requires that two years or two sets of years be focused on, often without substantive 
justification for the choice of years. 
Since the publication of DEB, Hoffmann and Miller have built upon DEB’s framework to 
control for other variables that may  cause polarization over time -- essentially creating multivariate 
variance and kurtosis trend models (1998).  Unfortunately, their method cannot determine the relative 
contribution of each variable toward a polarization trend:  it only removes that part of the polarization 
attributable to the control variable.  In a subsequent paper, Evans (2002) uses Hoffmann and Miller’s  
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technique, as well as the logic of sensitivity analysis to try to determine the underlying cause of 
polarization on abortion.  While this is an interesting and useful approach, the data reporting 
requirements are so immense that it cannot be used for more than a few comparisons.   
Recently, Mouw and Sobel criticized DEB’s methodology for, among other things, not being 
sensitive to the fact that none of the attitude scales in DEB were truly continuous variables, and 
suggested an analysis using contingency tables (2001).  As DEB pointed out in a response (Evans et al. 
2001), this method is quite useful for the examination of dispersion over time, but it cannot be used to 
examine other forms of polarization. Also, Mouw and Sobel’s method  explicitly assumes that there is 
no bi-modality and like Hoffmann and Miller’s approach, it is also impractical for large numbers of 
analyses.  Moreover, Mouw and Sobel report that their method can only be used with single variables, 
not with additive scales, which make up a majority of the dependent variables in DEB’s original paper.  
I will therefore not be able to use Mouw and Sobel’s  innovation for this paper. 
Finally, Downey and Huffman have recently determined that kurtosis, while still measuring bi-
modality, is insensitive to the fact that some opinion distributions may actually be tri-modal (2001).  
They found that 22 percent of the variables they examined in the GSS had “truly trimodal” distributions. 
 Unfortunately, they find it “impossible to offer a satisfactory alternative at this point,” but simply suggest 
that researchers look for tri-modality in the actual distributions before assessing summary statistics 
(Downey and Huffman 2001, 501).  Given that no superior alternative is offered, I examined the actual 
distributions and found little evidence of tri-modality.
4   
                                                                 
4  I am unaware of any measure of tri-modality.  Rather, one must look at a histogram and decide whether it 
has three distinct humps.  Combining all of the years of data and looking at the distribution for each variable, the only 
variable that might be interpreted as trimodal is the GSS sexual morality scale, but even this is questionable.  A more  
  10 
In my analysis, with DEB, a summary statistic which corresponds with a type of polarization is 
created for each group in each year under study.  For example, the variance on the omnibus scale for 
respondents with a college education in 1977 is one data point.  To make claims about trends in 
polarization, I examine the change over time in each of these parameters for each of the groups under 
study.  To examine within-group polarization, I simply regress the year of the survey on the value of the 
parameter (mean, variance, kurtosis or alpha).   An increase in variance and/or alpha, and a decrease in 
kurtosis, is indicative of increased polarization.
5  As in DEB, I report increases or decreases in the mean 
for each group.  While this does not speak to polarization per se, it is useful for our understanding of 
what may be occurring to the opinions of the group. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
difficult question is what to make of the NES feeling thermometers, which are 100 point likert scales.  As is well 
known, respondents do not pick the “in between” numbers (e.g. 62), but rather the “round” numbers (e.g. 60).  
Therefore, the feeling thermometer variables are all multi-modal, with responses concentrated at the “round” 
numbers.  My understanding of the behavior of the kurtosis statistic suggests that this does not create the sort of 
problem that Downey and Huffman identify, but clearly additional research is required on the topic of measuring bi-
modality in non-continuous variables. 
5 The GSS does not provide sampling weights.  There are, however, a few years where the GSS over-sampled 
African Americans.  Due to the complexity of using weights in my analysis (see below), instead of weighting the 
cases in these years, I followed the common practice of removing the respondents who were part of the oversample.  
Therefore, there were no weights used for the GSS.   
The NES provides a variety of weights to correct for sample construction biases and attrition from the NES’ 
panel components.  I applied these weights in the manner suggested by the NES documentation.  In the 1990s the 
NES began a panel design, with pre-and post-election waves.  I used the weights suggested for the particular survey 
the question was on, either before or after the election.  For the omnibus scale,  some of the components were asked 
in the pre-election wave and some in the post-election wave.  In this instance I used the weights for the post-election 
wave because if a respondent dropped from the sample between waves, he would have missing values on some of 
the scale components anyway, thus making his case have a missing value on the omnibus scale. 
The primary challenge in using weights is that while statistical programs easily allow the calculation of a 
weighted mean, they do not allow for the calculation of weighted variances, alphas and kurtoses.  To estimate these 
weighted parameters I inflated the data set based on the weight variables. Each observation was inflated into the 
number of observations corresponding to its weight. The weights had five significant digits, but memory limitations 
allowed the use of only four significant digits for the weights. Thus, each observation was inflated into anywhere 
from 0 to 10000 observations [the largest weight was actually only 3428]. Then, means, variances, kurtoses, and 
alphas were calculated from the data in the usual way as if the inflated data set were a simple random sample.  While 
this would obviously confound estimates of the standard error,  I do not, at this stage of the analysis,  engage in 
inference, just parameter estimation.  
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To examinee between-group polarization (consolidation), I regress the year of the study on the 
absolute difference between the mean of the two groups.  An increase in this difference is indicative of 
increased between-group polarization.  To emphasize again, these are all simple regressions because: a) 
multivariate models, while developed, are not practical (see above); and b) there are very few cases in 
each regression. 
Regression Strategies 
I rely upon ordinary least squares regression to summarize the trend in polarization.  One 
challenge to this approach is that because DEB used group/year as the unit of analysis, there are, at 
best, as many cases as there are years of the survey, but often fewer, because not all questions were 
asked in all of the years.  The largest number of cases in any of the analyses is 18 and the lowest is 7.  
In any analysis with so few cases, one must be particularly concerned that idiosyncratic cases do not 
unduly influence the analysis.  For example, if there are only 7 cases in the analysis, one additional case 
which is an outlier can make a non-significant finding significant or a significant finding insignificant.  To 
guard against this possibility,  I re-ran all of the analyses in this paper using a robust regression model 
where influential cases are down-weighted so as to not unduly influence the results (Western 1995; 
StataCorp 2001).  Neither type of analysis is more true than the other; they are simply different ways of 
summarizing the data. 
 
RESULTS 
DEB presented graphical depictions of the change in polarization over time as well as tables 
summarizing the graphs.  To save space in this paper, I present the results only in tables.  Even using  
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only tables, there is too much information to present.  I therefore present only the OLS models and 
describe the robust models when they differ, which is not often (robust results available upon request).  
As in DEB, I start by examining polarization in the entire sample, move on to looking at polarization 
within sub-samples of the population, and finally study polarization between groups. 
Within-group Polarization in the Population as a Whole 
The most general examination of polarization is whether the entire population is polarizing on 
social issues in general.  To determine this,  I examine trends in the omnibus scales, which are 
compilations of all of the different variables.  As in DEB I found no evidence of overall polarization.  
Even with the additional years of data, the NES scale is constant over time in variance, kurtosis and 
alpha (see Table 3).  As in DEB the GSS scale continues to show a decrease in the dispersion 
(variance) type of polarization (see Table 4).
6   
                                                                 
6  If anything, the decline in polarization is accelerating, with this coefficient being about 28% larger than in 
DEB.  This increasing depolarization is a bit ambiguous, however, because a scatter plot (not shown) and the robust 
model both suggest that this increase in the size of the coefficient is due to the last year of the series, which has a 
very low variance compared to the remainder of the years.   
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Table 3.  OLS Regression Coefficients for Time Trend (Year): Within-Group Statistics, NES, 
1972-2000.   
             Mean    Variance  Kurtosis  Alpha   
Omnibus Scale (n=11)  
  Full Sample    -0.729*    -14.068    0.005     -0.001   
  college     -0.350    15.053    0.002     0.001   
  voters      -0.621    2.772     -0.001    0.001#   
  under 30      -0.416    2.081     0.010     -0.001   
  politically active  0.394     92.994*    -0.012    0.005#   
Feelings thermometer: 
  Blacks (n=14) 
    full        -0.135#    0.138     -0.018*   
    college       -0.209*   1.709     -0.036*   
    voters       -0.145#    -0.764    -0.030**   
    under 30        -0.253*    2.622     -0.038**   
    politically active  -0.143#    0.805     -0.019   
   Poor (n=13) 
     full       0.146*    2.524**    -0.018#   
     college      0.058     1.778     -0.043*   
     voters      0.140*    1.950*    -0.024**   
     under 30       0.088     4.570**    -0.003   
     politically active  0.059     2.642#    -0.014   
 
Liberals (n=14) 
      full      0.016     1.610     -0.009   
      college      0.030     1.821     -0.001   
      voters       0.055     2.617     -0.014   
      under 30      0.004     2.479     -0.011   
      politically active  0.280*    9.364**    -0.025*   
    Conservatives (n=14)       
      full      -0.088    1.773     -0.017*   
      college      0.009     0.570     -0.021**   
      voters      -0.067    2.260     -0.017*   
      under 30      0.005     2.561     -0.028#   
      politically active  0.022     4.285*    -0.019*   
Aid to Minorities (n=15)      
  full        0.017**    -0.029*    0.015*   
  college       0.026**    -0.009    0.001   
  voters      0.017**    -0.028*    0.015*   
  under 30       0.025***    -0.003    0.002    
  14 
 Table 3 Continued . . . 
             Mean    Variance  Kurtosis  Alpha 
 politically active  0.025**    -0.023    0.013   
 
Women’s Roles (n=14)         
    
 full        -0.046***    -0.081***    0.086***   
  college     -0.027***    -0.049***    0.089***   
  voters      -0.044***    -0.075***    0.083***   
  under 30      -0.039***    -0.079***    0.128***   
  politically active  -0.032***    -0.056***    0.060***   
Abortion (n=14) 
  full        -0.011***    0.010***    -0.009***   
  college     -0.007*    0.004#    0.014   
  voters      -0.011**    0.008**    -0.005*   
  under 30      -0.001    0.011**    -0.007**   
  politically active  -0.009*    0.005#    0.008     
Note: # = p<.10, *=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001 
 
 
Table 4.  OLS Regression Coefficients for Time Trend (Year): Within-Group Statistics, GSS, 
1972-2000.   
             Mean    Variance  Kurtosis  Alpha   
Omnibus Scale (n=9) 
  Full Sample    -.360***    -1.944**     .003     -.002#  
  college (N=7)   -.133      -.0929    -.009     .001 
  voters      -.376***    -1.496*    -.011     -.001 
  under 30      -.244**    -1.888#     .004     -.004 
Abortion (n=17) 
  full         .001       .034***    -.008**   .001*** 
 college       .022***     .077***     -.042***   .001*** 
 voters       .001       .042***   -.011**    .001*** 
 under 30        .008       .031#     -.012***    .001# 
Family Gender Roles (n=11) 
  full        -.094**     -.051*     .014*     -.000 
 college      -.059***   -.024      .005     .000 
 voters      -.096***    -.039      .011#     .000 
 under 30       -.075***    -.043*     .008     .002   
Women’s Public Roles (n=16) 
  full        -.030***    -.029***     .178***   -.002**  
  15 
  Table 4 Continued . . . 
             Mean    Variance  Kurtosis  Alpha 
college      -.014***    -.015***     .274***   -.000 
  voters       -.029***     -.027***     .186***   -.002* 
  under 30      -.018***    -.021***     .240***   -.004* 
Sexuality (n=13)       
  full        -.020*     .004      -.026*    -.003* 
  college      -.002     -.025     -.003     -.003#   
voters      -.024*     .008      -.030*    -.003* 
  under 30       .003       .002      -.011     -.003 
Crime and Justice (n=18)      
  full        -.003     -.004*     .022**   -.000 
  college       -.004     -.006*     .016#     -.004 
  voters      -.004      -.003#     .017**   .000 
  under 30       .001     -.004#      .022*     -.000 
Racism (n=9)       
  full        -.059***    -.068**     .032*     -.005* 
  college (n=7)    -.032**    -.048*     -.006     -.004 
  voters      -.061***    -.067*       .029#     -.004 
  under 30      -.040**    -.078*     .044     -.011# 
   
Note: # = p<.10, *=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001 
 
Therefore, as before, the conclusion is that polarization in this most general of senses is not 
occurring within the general public.  However, these variables are very blunt instruments.  As a first step 
toward sharpening our tools, I consider whether the general public is becoming more polarized on 
individual issues.   
Race and Poverty.  As in DEB, the GSS racial-attitude scale demonstrates a trend toward less 
polarization in racial attitudes, with declines in variance and increases in kurtosis.  A change from DEB is 
that now alpha is also shown to be decreasing, suggesting an even fuller decline in polarization.  The  
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feelings towards blacks variable in the NES shows no change in polarization over time.
7   Polarization in 
the NES aid to minorities variable also declined, with a change from DEB being that the decline is not 
only in variance but kurtosis as well.   
                                                                 
7 There is a significant polarizing trend in kurtosis in the OLS model shown in Table 3, but the coefficient in 
the robust model is not significant (not shown).  Therefore, because this trend seems to be due to outliers, I note the 
different conclusions here but will interpret this variable as not changing from that reported in DEB. 
With the additional data there is a slight change in interpretation from DEB.  While DEB 
reported that attitudes toward government assistance for minorities seemed to become more polarized 
from the mid-1980s on, new data I show that this was not actually a trend.  In fact, the decreasing 
polarization trend that was in force before the mid-1980s has re-asserted itself in recent years.  Finally, 
as in DEB, feelings toward poor people have polarized over the time period.   Therefore, I conclude 
that in the general population, polarization has, if anything, slightly declined on issues of race, but not on 
poverty. 
Gender.  In DEB, the three scales representing gender issues become less polarized over time 
in all available measures.  This result remains unchanged with the additional years of data. 
Crime and Justice.  While the data examined here still show a decline in polarization over 
crime and justice issues, the coefficients are 43% and 41% smaller in variance and kurtosis, 
respectively, and a previously significant decline in constraint  now shows no change.  This is due to a 
dramatic turn toward increasing polarization after 1994, with the three measures returning to levels 
found in 1974 (not shown).  I can only speculate at this point about the reasons for this dramatic turn-
around, but this period of time found increasing public debates over the three components of the scale:  
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the death penalty (with the release of movies such as Dead Man Walking), gun control (with debates 
over the militia movement and the Oklahoma bombing), and the courts’ treatment of criminals (with 
debates about the O.J. Simpson trial ). 
 Attitudes Towards Liberals and Conservatives.  DEB were interested in whether Americans 
have become more polarized in their reaction to political labels.  As in DEB, the answer is that 
Americans are not becoming more polarized, with the exception of a slight polarizing trend in bi-
modality (kurtosis) on feelings toward conservatives.   
Abortion and Sexuality.   Abortion was the one issue where DEB found unambiguous 
evidence of polarization in the general population.  Here I find that the extent of polarization on abortion 
remains the same as reported in DEB, with the GSS and NES showing polarization in all senses of the 
term.  However, DEB did not put too much interpretive weight on the across-time analysis of the NES 
abortion variable because they suspected that a change in wording mid-way through the series would 
affect the results -- a suspicion confirmed by Mouw and Sobel (2001).  I will therefore not discuss the 
NES abortion measure separately below.
8 
DEB found no polarization in the sexual morality scale, but I do find evidence of increasing 
polarization.  Despite increasing liberalism on the issue (e.g. a declining mean), the coefficient for 
kurtosis is much smaller compared to DEB, and, unlike in DEB, this coefficient is statistically significant. 
 The trend in variance is positive but not significant.  What the linear model in variance masks is a u-
shaped pattern with decreasing variance until about 1990 and then a rapid increase in variance to 2000, 
                                                                 
8 The NES abortion variable remains in the omnibus measure so that this study can be compared to DEB.  
The change is slight enough that it should not unduly perturb the omnibus scale since it is comprised of so many 
elements.  
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with the variance for the year 2000 surpassing the value from 1974.  Yet, this case of polarization is a 
bit ambiguous because while the decreasing polarization trend in the alpha has declined 40%, it remains 
significant. 
Conclusions about Polarization in the General Public.  Attitudes toward race gender and 
feelings toward liberals and conservatives all are declining in polarization, as found in DEB.  However, 
the additional years of data have suggested a turn-around in crime and justice, which now shows 
evidence of increasing polarization.  Similarly, the polarization that DEB found in the general public in 
attitudes toward abortion continues, and now attitudes toward sexuality are indicating polarization.  I will 
discuss possible explanations and interpretations of these findings after presenting all of the results. 
Within-Group Polarization in Subgroups 
While looking at individual issues is a sharper tool than looking at all issues combined, it will 
sharpen our tools even more to look at polarization for each issue within particular subgroups in the 
population.  DEB selected sub-groups they expected were polarizing.  I report polarization findings that 
are different from the polarization (or lack thereof) found in the general population.
9 
Participants in the Political System.   DEB had two ways of measuring political participation 
-- voting and a series of questions about engagement in political acts. DEB found that people who had 
voted in the last presidential election had a slight tendency toward more polarization.  Recent data 
illustrate that the difference has disappeared. Voters are not appreciably different from the rest of the 
                                                                 
9 By “different” I mean a situation where a polarization trend is statistically significant in one case and not in 
another.    
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population in terms of polarization (see Tables 3 and 4). 
On the other hand, and in contrast to DEB, the politically active in the NES show increasing 
polarization in variance on the omnibus scale.
10  DEB found that the politically active were not polarizing 
in attitudes to the poor, while the general population was.  I find here that they are, like the public, 
becoming more polarized.  DEB also found that they were more polarized in variance in their feelings 
towards liberals, but the general public was not.  Now I find polarization in both variance and kurtosis 
on feelings not only toward liberals, but toward conservatives as well.
11  In sum, the politically active are 
becoming more polarized, especially on the most political of matters - feelings toward liberals and 
conservatives. 
College Graduates.  Similar to the politically active, it is plausible that the more highly educated 
members are more attentive to discourse on social issues and therefore may become more polarized.  
We may also expect to find polarization due to the higher levels of political activism among the educated 
as well as the growing racial and religious diversity of the college educated population. 
                                                                 
10 They also show increasing alpha (constraint) in OLS models, but this is contradicted by the robust 
models, so this finding is not emphasized here. 
11 A difference from DEB in the variance trend in aid to minorities, shown in Table 4, is not supported by the 
robust models. 
DEB found scattered evidence of a resistance to the declines that the general population was 
making.  They found that unlike the general public, college graduates showed no decline in variance on 
the GSS omnibus scale, or in attitudes toward racial integration.  The former is still true in the present  
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analysis, yet the latter is not.   DEB found, and the present analysis concurs, that college graduates show 
no increase in kurtosis for racial attitudes, while the general population does.  Both DEB and this 
analysis also find no decline in alphas for attitudes toward women’s public roles, but the general 
population has such a decline.  As before, there is no consistent story to tell about polarization among 
the college educated. 
However, it is also interesting to note that the views of the college educated on abortion (GSS) 
are not only becoming more conservative (while the general population remains the same), but their rate 
of polarization is double that of the general population in dispersion (variance) and five times the rate for 
bi-modality.  This pattern remains unchanged from DEB, although DEB neglected to discuss this trend in 
their paper. 
Young People.  It could be the next generation that is polarizing, suggesting that the concerns of 
general polarization are simply ahead of their time.  Looking for polarization among people between the 
ages of 18 and 29 (when they filled out the survey), DEB found that the “differences between young 
people and the general public are numerous but inconclusive” because some measures suggested 
increased polarization and some decreased polarization (DiMaggio et al. 1996, 720).  All but a few of 
the differences from the general public noted in DEB have disappeared with the additional data, but new 
differences have replaced them.  In the present analysis, the young are different from the general public 
by not exhibiting declining polarization in family gender roles (kurtosis), racial attitudes (kurtosis), and 
aid to minorities (kurtosis and variance).  Yet, they are also different from the general public by not 
exhibiting a decrease in kurtosis (increasing polarization) in sexual morality or attitudes toward the poor. 
 In sum, the polarization among the young remains inconclusive.  
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Summary.   Like DEB, I looked for polarization on each separate issue within several 
sub-populations.  DEB concluded that this exercise resulted in no clear pattern of polarization 
within any one population.  Recent data result in similar conclusions, however there does seem to 
be more evidence now for polarization among the politically active than there was in DEB. 
 
Polarization as Between-Group Difference 
In this section I examine whether polarization is occurring not within groups, but between 
groups (consolidation).  For each pair of contrasting groups I calculate the absolute value of the 
difference in means of the two groups and regress this value on the year of the survey.  If the 
difference is increasing, then this is evidence of polarization between the groups.   
As in DEB, if I find polarization between two groups, then I also consider the increasing 
bi-modality within each of the two groups.   I am only interested in between-group difference 
because of its potential for conflict.  However, if one or both of the groups is polarizing internally, 
then its ability to conflict with the other group – despite its growing distance – is greatly diminished 
and any observed between-group difference is of lessened importance.  
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Table 5: OLS Regression Coefficients for Time Trend (Year): Between-Group 
Comparisons, NES   
 
Absolute Difference               Kurtosis            
        In Means   Group A  Group B 
Omnibus Scale (n=11) 
  A. Over45/B. under35                 -0.546**    -0.004    0.003   
  A. Conservative/B. liberal                -0.020    -0.003    0.018#   
  A. Women/B. men                  0.426**  0.008     0.008   
  A. African-American/B. white       -1.390**    -0.004    0.005   
  A. College degree/B. high school or less     -0.531    0.002     -0.001   
  A. Democrat/B. Republican                1.287**  0.005     0.005   
  A. South/B. other                  -0.236#    0.016     -0.001   
Feelings Thermometer:  
  Blacks (n=14) 
     A. Over45/B. under35               -0.032    0.000     -0.042***  
     A. Conservative/B. liberal               -0.054#    -0.021*    -0.013*   
     A. Women/B. men                 -0.028    -0.020#    -0.015#   
     A. African-American/B. white              -0.430**    -0.090#    -0.028*   
     A. College degree/B. high school or less           -0.013    -0.036*    -0.007   
     A. Democrat/B. Republican               0.017     -0.012    -0.017   
     A. South/B. other                 0.082#    -0.019#    -0.012   
 Poor (n=13) 
     A. Over45/B. under35               -0.080#    -0.027#    -0.016   
     A. Conservative/B. liberal               -0.040*    -0.034*    -0.017   
     A. Women/B. men                 0.040     -0.014    -0.016   
     A. African-American/B. white              -0.275**    -0.089#    -0.021*   
     A. College degree/B. high school or less           -0.124#    -0.043*    -0.004   
     A. Democrat/B. Republican               0.005*   -0.033    -0.031#   
     A. South/B. other                 -0.012    -0.020    -0.016   
Liberals (n=14) 
     A. Over45/B. under35               0.027     -0.008    -0.011   
     A. Conservative/B. liberal               0.012     -0.011    0.004   
     A. Women/B. men                 0.079*    -0.013    -0.004   
     A. African-American/B. white              -0.227#    0.010     -0.015   
     A. College degree/B. high school or less           0.005     -0.001    -0.006   
     A. Democrat/B. Republican               0.262**  0.004     -0.021#   
     A. South/B. other                 -0.016    -0.001    -0.012    
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Table 5 (continued)  
Absolute Difference               Kurtosis            
        In Means   Group A  Group B 
   Conservatives (n=14)  
      A. Over45/B. under35               -0.159*    -0.010    -0.032*   
      A. Conservative/B. liberal               0.043     -0.007    -0.025*   
      A. Women/B. men                 0.027     -0.020*    -0.009   
      A. African-American/B. white             -0.302***    -0.009    -0.013*   
      A. College degree/B. high school or less           -0.080*    -0.021**    -0.005   
      A. Democrat/B. Republican               0.202***  -0.013    -0.014   
      A. South/B. other                 -0.011    -0.012    -0.017*   
Aid to Minorities (n=15) 
  A. Over45/B. under35                 -0.014*    0.018*   0.005   
  A. Conservative/B. liberal               -0.005    0.022**    0.014*   
  A. Women/B. men                 0.002     0.013#   0.017*   
  A. African-American/B. white               -0.044***    -0.045***    0.014*   
  A. College degree/B. high school or less            -0.011*    0.001     0.019*   
  A. Democrat/B. Republican               0.014**  0.016*   0.026***   
  A. South/B. other                 -0.005*    0.016#    0.014*   
Women’s Roles (n=14) 
 A. Over45/B. under35                -0.010*    0.063***  0.122***   
 A. Conservative/B. liberal                -0.001    0.062***    0.131***   
 A. Women/B. men                  0.000     0.093***    0.078***   
 A. African-American/B. white       0.000     0.070***  0.087***   
 A. College degree/B. high school or less     -0.029***    0.089***  0.064***   
 A. Democrat/B. Republican                0.009#   0.121***  0.053***   
 A. South/B. other                  -0.003    0.087***  0.087***   
Abortion (n=14) 
 A. Over45/B. under35                -0.011***    -0.023***    -0.006*   
 A. Conservative/B. liberal               0.012***  -0.019***    -0.002   
 A. Women/B. men                 0.000     -0.012***    -0.007**   
 A. African-American/B. white              -0.008**    -0.019**    -0.007***   
 A. College degree/B. high school or less           -0.006*    0.014     -0.030***   
 A. Democrat/B. Republican               0.008**  -0.014**    -0.010**   
 A. South/B. other                 0.000     -0.026***    -0.002   
   
Note: # = p<.10, *=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001   
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Table 6: OLS Regression Coefficients for Time Trend (Year): Between-Group Comparisons, 
GSS   
 
Absolute Difference               Kurtosis            
        In Means   Group A  Group B 
Omnibus Scale (n=9) 
  A. Over45/B. under35                 -.211*   -.011     .012 
  A. Conservative/B. liberal                .007     .002     .011  
  A. Women/B. men                  .054     .010     -.007    
  A. African-American/B. white (n=6)            -.225     -.066      .003  
  A. Religious liberals/B. conservatives (n=7)          -.399***  -.003     -.002 
  A. College degree/B. high school or less (n=7)          -.246*   -.009     .002  
  A. Democrat/B. Republican                .266**   -.025     -.003  
  A. South/B. other                  -.013     .006       .005  
Abortion (n=17) 
  A. Over45/B. under35                 -.009     -.010***  -.011** 
 A. Conservative/B. liberal               .051***  -.006*   .013 
 A. Women/B. men                 .003     -.010**  -.007* 
 A. African-American/B. white               -.024*   .001     -.011** 
 A. Religious liberals/B. conservatives             -.035***  -.053**  -.023** 
 A. College degree/B. high school or less            -.017*   -.042***  -.006* 
 A. Democrat/B. Republican               .029**   .000     -.016*** 
 A. South/B. other                 -.006     -.010***  -.010* 
Family Gender Roles (n=11) 
 A. Over45/B. under35                 -.045**  -.014**  .016 
 A. Conservative/B. liberal               .005     .002     .025* 
 A. Women/B. men                 .013     .021**   .015 
 A. African-American/B. white               -.008     .024     .015# 
 A. Religious liberals/B. conservatives             -.025**  .018#     -.008 
 A. College degree/B. high school or less             -.035*   .005     .007  
 A. Democrat/B. Republican               .027*    .014     -.008 
 A. South/B. other                 -.002     .010#     .017# 
Women’s public Roles (n=16) 
 A. Over45/B. under35                 -.018***  .106***   .247*** 
 A. Conservative/B. liberal               -.005     .116***  .255*** 
 A. Women/B. men                 -.001     .191***  .162*** 
 A. African-American/B. white               -.002     .165***  .188*** 
 A. Religious liberals/B. conservatives             -.016***  .186***  .105*** 
 A. College degree/B. high school or less            -.016***  .274***  .107***  
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Table 6 (continued)  
Absolute Difference               Kurtosis            
        In Means   Group A  Group B 
 A. Democrat/B. Republican               -.003     .189***  .123*** 
 A. South/B. other                 -.009**  .133***  .211*** 
Sexuality (n=13) 
 A. Over45/B. under35                 -.041***  -.077**  -.011 
 A. Conservative/B. liberal               .011     -.036     -.004 
 A. Women/B. men                 -.009     -.033*   -.018 
 A. African-American/B. white               .019     .018     -.031* 
 A. Religious liberals/B. conservatives             -.020#   .002     -.070* 
 A. College degree/B. high school or less            -.013*   -.003     -.030* 
 A. Democrat/B. Republican               .025*    -.044***  -.035** 
 A. South/B. other                 -.001     -.039#   -.021* 
Crime and Justice (n=18) 
 A. Over45/B. under35                 -.005**  .018#    .019** 
 A. Conservative/B. liberal               -.001     .015     .017* 
 A. Women/B. men                 -.004**  .029*    .011* 
 A. African-American/B. white               -.002     .012     .027*** 
 A. Religious liberals/B. conservatives             -.002     .023*    .019# 
 A. College degree/B. high school or less            .001     .016#    .028** 
 A. Democrat/B. Republican               .007**   .009     .033* 
 A. South/B. other                 -.000     .028**   .019* 
Racial Attitudes (n=9)  
 A. Over45/B. under35                  -.036**  .019     .034 
 A. Conservative/B. liberal                -.009     .027     .037 
 A. Women/B. men                  -.005     .032*    .029# 
 A. African-American/B. white (n=6)             -.040     -.174     .031* 
 A. Religious liberals/B. conservatives (n=7)            -.047**  .010     .034# 
 A. College degree/B. high school or less (n=7)           -.029*   -.006     .027# 
 A. Democrat/B. Republican                .030*    .031     .026 
 A. South/B. other                  -.024*   .041*     .029* 
Sex education (n=16)  
 A. Over45/B. under35                 -.004*** 
 A. Conservative/B. liberal               .002# 
 A. Women/B. men                 -.001** 
 A. African-American/B. white               -.001 
 A. Religious liberals/B. conservatives             -.002* 
 A. College degree/B. high school or less            -.005***  
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 Table 6 (continued)  
Absolute Difference               Kurtosis            
        In Means   Group A  Group B 
 
A. Democrat/B. Republican           .002  
A. South/B. other           -.002* 
School Prayer (n=16) 
 A. Over45/B. under35                 -.000 
 A. Conservative/B. liberal               .003# 
 A. Women/B. men                 .001 
 A. African-American/B. white               .002 
 A. Religious liberals/B. conservatives             -.001  
 A. College degree/B. high school or less            .004* 
 A. Democrat/B. Republican               .002# 
 A. South/B. other                 .002 
Divorce Law (n=18) 
 A. Over45/B. under35                 -.009*** 
 A. Conservative/B. liberal               -.000 
 A. Women/B. men                 -.002* 
 A. African-American/B. white               -.001 
 A. Religious liberals/B. conservatives             -.012*** 
 A. College degree/B. high school or less            -.008* 
 A. Democrat/B. Republican               .007*** 
 A. South/B. other                 -.001 
   
Note: # = p<.10, *=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001  
     
Age.  DEB found no instances of increasing between-group difference between those less than 
35 years old and those over 45.  (See Tables 5 and 6).  Indeed, they found that 12 of 18 measures 
showed convergence in attitudes.  The additional data used in this paper does not change this finding.  
With data for 1972 to 2000,  I find that 13 of 17 measures show convergence, and 4 show no  
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convergence or divergence.
12 
                                                                 
12 There is one less measure because I am no longer considering the NES abortion item separately. 
Educational Attainment.   Much sociological theory, such as the theory of the “new class” 
(Gouldner 1979; Brint 1984), suggests that there would be a growing divide between groups based 
upon their education.  Instead, comparing those with  college degrees to those with no more than  high 
school degrees, DEB found convergence on 9 of 18 measures and polarization on none.   I now find 
convergence on 12 of 17, but with polarization on one – school prayer.  (In DEB school prayer was 
just short of significantly showing polarization).  However, the overall theme is clear:  anything, there is 
even less evidence of polarization between educational groups than in DEB. 
Gender.  Political scientists have identified a gender gap in voting behavior, but DEB found little 
evidence of the gender gap in attitudes.  They found a small degree of polarization on the NES omnibus 
scale, convergence in attitudes about crime and sex education, and no convergence or divergence on 
the other issues.  In my analysis the results remain the same, with the addition of polarization in attitudes 
towards liberals and of convergence in attitudes toward divorce law.  There remains no large amount of 
polarization by gender.  
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Race.  Racial divisions in attitudes are well established, but, are they growing over time or 
remaining constant?  DEB found no instances of increasing polarization and many instances of 
decreasing polarization between blacks and whites.  With the new data the results are substantively 
identical.  On no issue is there increasing polarization, but there is decreasing polarization in the NES 
omnibus scale in feelings toward blacks, the poor, liberals, and conservatives, as well as on aid to 
minorities and abortion (GSS).  The issues on which opinion is not converging generally deal with  the 
status of women and sexuality.  In other words, black and white attitudes toward women’s roles (NES), 
family gender roles (GSS), women’s public roles (GSS), sexual morality,
13 sex education and divorce 
law are not converging.  Additionally, blacks and whites are not converging on school prayer, racial 
attitudes (GSS) and the GSS omnibus scale.  The only change from DEB is that blacks and whites are 
no longer converging on the crime and justice scale.  The scatter plot (not shown) suggests that this last 
change is due to a polarization trend after about 1994 when blacks became markedly more liberal and 
whites remained on their previous trajectory. 
Religion. Many assume that  polarization between religious groups is driving all polarization 
(Hunter 1991; Hunter 1994).  DEB relied upon a fairly crude religious division between “religious 
conservatives” and “religious liberals” not only to make measurement possible, but also to operationalize 
the central claims about polarization made by others.  Others have broken religious groups into smaller 
categories to look for polarization on particular variables, yielding interesting results (Evans 2002; 
                                                                 
13 Inspection of a scatter plot (not shown) reveals that this non-convergence is actually masking a rapid 
merger in views from 1974 to about 1990, and then a rapid polarization, with blacks starting off as very liberal and 
ending up as very conservative, and whites starting out as very conservative and ending up as very liberal.  
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Hoffmann and Miller, 1997; Hoffmann and Miller 1998).  For comparability with DEB, I retain their 
coding. 
DEB found that religious liberals and conservatives were not polarizing as is commonly 
assumed, but rather had been converging on 7 of 9 issues.  Of the GSS variables, the only issues on 
which they did not converge were crime and justice and school prayer.  With the additional data used in 
this paper, the results remain exactly the same, meaning that the decline in polarization has continued 
since the mid-1990s – the last data used in DEB. 
Region. – DEB hypothesized that the well-documented differences in opinion between residents 
of the South, residents of the rest of the country may reflect polarization processes at work.  While the 
continued growth of a national culture through television and other media would suggest a declining 
polarization, the growth of the Republican party in the South, which emphasized social issues, suggests 
at least the possibility of polarization.   DEB found no evidence of polarization.  Instead, moderate to 
large differences in attitudes between the South and the Non-South either remained constant over the 
time series or declined.   More recent data confirms that the same variables that were converging then 
are converging now.
14 
Ideology.  Polarization may be a political reality if political identities become linked to particular 
social attitudes.  For example, people who self-identify as “conservatives” may come to think that being 
a “conservative” means being opposed to abortion, women’s participation in public life, sex education, 
                                                                 
14 In the OLS models, there is a slight polarization in attitudes towards blacks (NES).  This trend was present, 
but smaller and insignificant in DEB.  However, in the robust model (not shown), there is not polarization, suggesting 
that this finding is driven by outliers.  
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etc.  “Liberals” might think of themselves as defined by their support of these issues.  Thus, polarization 
could be occurring between self-identified conservatives and liberals. 
DEB found a few cases of convergence in attitudes (attitudes toward the poor, aid to minorities 
and women’s public roles), but primarily no change in the gulf that separates liberals and conservatives.  
They did, however, find one clear case of polarization: in attitudes toward abortion.  To “be a 
conservative” or to “be a liberal” became more tightly connected to abortion attitudes over the years of 
the study (for a similar result, see Hout 1999)). 
We now see that this polarization was indicative of a broader trend that was only beginning to 
appear when DEB was written.  The polarization reported in DEB continues, but now there is also 
polarization between liberals and conservatives in attitudes toward sex education and school prayer.  
For the school prayer variable, a trend not quite significant in DEB becomes significant in light of the 
additional data, which allow greater confidence in the findings.  For the sex education variable, the 
newfound polarization is the result of a trend beginning in about 1990 of growing conservatism among 
conservatives and growing liberalism among liberals. 
Additionally, if trends continue, then in a few more years sexual morality will reach the threshold 
for measuring polarization.
15  Similarly, the coefficient for divorce law, while not shown to be 
significantly polarizing in either DEB or now, changed from -.004 to -.000.  On a scatter plot the change 
in this trend seems to be the result of a convergence from 1974 to the mid 1980s, and then a slow 
                                                                 
15  The coefficient remains insignificant, but it was .002 in DEB and is now .011.  This reflects a sharp 
liberalizing trend among liberals beginning in 1990.  
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divergence to 1993, with a strong divergence after 1994 attributable primarily to a strong conservative 
trend among people who identify as “conservatives.”  Finally, while in DEB attitudes towards women’s 
public roles were converging between liberals and conservatives, this no longer holds true.  Examination 
of the scatter plot (not shown) reveals that attitudes converged until the late 1980s and have run parallel 
since then.  The additional years showing no change simply began to outweigh the smaller number of 
years which showed convergence. 
It appears that the “liberal” and “conservative” labels have increasingly become markers of 
positions on social issues over time (Miller and Hoffmann 1999).  “Conservatives” are those who are 
aligned with the social agenda of the social conservative wing of the Republican Party, and “liberals” are 
those aligned with the social liberals in the Democratic party. 
Party Identification.   DEB concluded that mechanisms that political scientists have identified 
as attracting parties to the political center seem to have broken down.  DEB identified nine issues on 
which Democrats and Republicans had become more polarized, and 8 on which they had remained 
constant in their differences.  While this polarization has been observed among elected officials (Poole 
and Rosenthal 2001), it has not been observed in the general public.  We see now that when the data 
used by DEB ended in 1994, they were simply seeing the early signs of a much more significant trend.  
With the additional data, 14 of 17 variables show polarization between Democrats and Republicans, 
while only 3 do not change (there are no convergences.) 
DEB noted divergence in the NES and GSS omnibus scales, abortion, feelings toward the poor, 
liberals and conservatives, as well as in attitudes toward crime and justice, racial attitudes and divorce 
law.  These trends all continued in the new analyses.  However, we now see polarization between the  
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parties in attitudes toward aid to minorities, women’s roles (NES), family gender roles (GSS), sexual 
morality and school prayer. 
While this might suggest increasing conflict between the parties, an examination of the extent of 
internal polarization within each party complicates this conclusion.  While the two groups are separating 
in their mean opinion, the Republicans are becoming increasingly internally polarized over  the poor, 
liberals and abortion.  Both groups are becoming more internally polarized on attitudes toward sexual 
morality.   Internal divisions should lessen the willingness of a group to battle on an issue.  If there are 
any issues that are more prone to conflict due to the increasing polarization between the groups, they are 
aid to minorities and women’s roles (NES) because in these two cases polarization between groups is 
accompanied by decreasing polarization within both groups, suggesting that there will be greater support 
for any conflict within each group.  That said, it is clear that polarization between the parties has 
broadened since DEB’s  analyses.
16 
                                                                 
16 With robust models the school prayer variable does not show significant polarization.  However, while the 
OLS model for the sex education variable does not, it is significant in the robust model. In terms of my point about the 
growing allegiance of the two parties to one or other side of the Religious Right’s issues, these two findings balance 
each other out. 
Conclusions.   As DEB found, there is little evidence of increasing polarization and more 
evidence of decreasing polarization between groups, including groups commonly thought to be 
polarizing, such as men and women, the young and the old, those with greater and lesser education, 
blacks and whites, residents of the South and residents of the rest of the country, and religious 
conservatives and liberals.  The one exception found in DEB was increasing polarization between those  
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who identify as Democrats and those who identify as Republicans.  This polarization has broadened to 
encompass more issues.  Also, whereas  DEB only found polarization between self-identified liberals 
and self-identified conservatives on the abortion issue, polarization between these two groups has 
broadened, with polarization now occurring on the issues of sex education and school prayer.  Evidence 
suggests that in a few years polarization between these two groups will be observed on a range of other 
issues as well. 
 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF DIFFERENCES IN POLARIZATION FINDINGS  
The most recent data used by DEB was the 1992 NES and the 1994 GSS.  Much has 
transpired in U.S. society since that point, and replicating DEB’s analysis with updated data allows me 
to see if any changes in DEB’s conclusions about polarization in American society should be made. 
A secondary theme in DEB was the idea that polarization may simply be the result of the 
agendas of political movements.  DEB had framed their analysis not to test this idea explicitly, but more 
to assess the claim that polarization was the result of some macro-societal phenomena.  Evidence for the 
influence of political movements was at best suggestive, so it was not emphasized.  The particular 
patterns of newfound polarization in this paper suggest that the primary polarization occurring in the 
United States is among political activists who are becoming more polarized over the issues that have 
been of concern to politically active religious conservatives. 
Support for this interpretation comes from the following.  First, polarization seems to occur on 
issues that are important to politically active religious conservatives, such as abortion, sexuality, divorce 
law, school prayer and the like.  Second, it is now clear that the primary instances of between-group  
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polarization are between people who are identified by their politics, not by their gender, religion, race or 
some other identity.  Note that it is not the marginally politically involved who are polarizing (like voters), 
but rather those who identify with the partisan labels in the political system – people who label 
themselves liberals or conservatives, Democrats or Republicans.   
In sum, with the additional years of data we have a more fine-grained interpretation of 
polarization in America.  In contrast to DEB’s conclusion that there was really little polarization in 
America (with the exception of abortion and some polarization between Democrats and Republicans), it 
is now safe to say that their findings are simply indicative of what is now a broader pattern of 
polarization between those who identify with political labels. 
It is important to add that this polarization over the issues of concern to politically active 
religious conservatives is not accompanied by polarization between religious conservatives and religious 
liberals.  This could be for any number of reasons.  First, the categories could be too blunt.  Second, 
there is a difference between the politically active in the religious traditions and everyone else.  Third, the 




DEB concluded their study by asking why there was the perception of polarization when there 
was little evidence of polarization among the population.  They outlined twelve possible explanations.  In 
light of the additional years of data, which found an even more striking polarization based upon political 
identifications, I think we can narrow those 12 down to two prime suspects -- the polarization of  
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political parties and a crystallization of the meaning of “liberal” and “conservative.” 
Political scientists have found that polarization between Democrats and Republicans in Congress 
declined from the beginning of the twentieth century until World War II, was stable until the late 1970s, 
and since then has been increasing (Poole and Rosenthal 2001, 18-19).  If anything, Poole and 
Rosenthal conclude, the 1990s show an acceleration of the trend.  While Bartels has noted that “we 
know less than we should about the nature and extent of mass-level reactions to these elite-level 
developments” (2000, 44), other political scientists have concluded that the increasing partisanship of 
our elected officials has increased the partisanship of the general public (Hetherington 2001, 629).  The 
present study suggests that polarization is occurring between people who identify with the two parties.  
Of course, it is beyond the scope of this paper to determine whether polarization in the attitudes of the 
party identifiers changed the voting behavior of our representatives or if the behavior of our 
representatives has changed the view of the party identifiers.  I will leave that to my colleagues in 
political science to determine.   
Poole and Rosenthal also emphasize that this polarization is increasingly between the 
(Republican) rich and the (Democratic) poor and see the primary issue as the redistribution of wealth 
(McCarty et al. 1997).  DEB and this paper only examined two attitude questions that pertain to income 
redistribution -- attitudes toward the poor and aid to minorities -- and the results were ambiguous.  
While Poole and Rosenthal briefly mention that “gender, sexual orientation, abortion and other issues 
areas generally also map onto this dimension” (2001, 7), they  focus on redistribution, partly due to the 
limitations of their data, I believe.  Scholars in this tradition should consider whether polarization over 
social issues is another dimension that polarizes our elected officials, given that it seems to polarize the  
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rank-and-file political activists. 
One final analysis using the GSS (not shown) reveals an increase over time in the likelihood that 
a person identifying as a Republican also identifies as a “conservative,” and that a person identifying as a 
Democrat identifies as a “liberal.”
17  This suggests that the polarization observed in the people who 
identify with these terms is related to the polarization between the parties.  Additionally, Miller and 
Hoffmann (1999) find that the label “conservative” is increasingly used by the religiously orthodox and 
the label “liberal” by the religiously progressive.  This all points to attitude polarization driven by elites 
associated with the political system. 
A final point should be made.  DEB’s stated motivation was to test claims by Hunter and others 
that America is in a “culture war.” A tension in Hunter’s claims was that at times he would use public 
opinion data to investigate polarization (Hunter 1991; Hunter 1994, chapter 4), but at other times would 
argue that the conflict he identified could not be observed in the general public (1994, vii), but was 
restricted to elites in the political system, such as social movement activists.  The findings above suggest 
that the latter strand in Hunter’s work is more accurate and should be pursued.  
 
 
                                                                 
17 This was a regression using the GSS data with party identification as the dependent variable, and the 
liberal/conservative scale, year and a liberal/conservative-year interaction as independent variable.  The interaction 
term was significant, indicating that conservatives have become more associated with the Republican party over time 
and that liberals have become more associated with the Democratic party over time.    
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